Chapter 6

Scholarly Services

علمی خدمات

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Topic Seven: Service of the Qurʾān

خدمتِ قرآن

Ḥaḍrat Baḥr al-ʿUlūm (raḥimahu'llāh) composed a detailed Urdu commentary on the Qurʾān known as Tafsīr Ṣiddīqī. This commentary stands as one of his most enduring contributions to Islamic learning. In it he expounded each verse with scholarly rigour, drawing on Arabic philology, the principles of exegesis (uṣūl al-tafsīr), the transmitted narrations of the Companions and Followers, and the rulings of Islamic jurisprudence. His lectures in the mosque formed the living basis of this written work, and students who attended bear witness to the profound depth of his learning.

He composed it in such a way that an educated layman could benefit from it, while specialists in the Islamic sciences found in it precise scholarly discussions. Each verse is presented in its Arabic text, then given an Urdu rendering, and then a detailed tafsīr (exegesis). Ḥaḍrat brought his comprehensive mastery of all branches of Islamic learning — grammar, morphology, rhetoric, jurisprudence, ḥadīth, and mystical insight — to bear on every page.

The Purposes and Method of Qurʾānic Exegesis

Ḥaḍrat wrote and taught extensively on the proper method of interpreting the Qurʾān. He held that the Book of Allāh is the fountainhead of guidance for humankind in every age and every circumstance. The interpreter must approach it with sincerity, free of personal whim and prejudice, relying on the corpus of Prophetic ḥadīth (sayings and actions of the Prophet ﷺ), the understandings of the Companions (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhum), and the tools of Arabic philology.

He held that the first and most authoritative interpreter of the Qurʾān is the Prophet ﷺ himself, through his blessed words, actions, and tacit approbations. After him come the Companions, then the Followers (Tābiʿūn), and then the great scholars of the Ummah. Ḥaḍrat emphasised that the commentator must be well-grounded in Arabic grammar (naḥw), morphology (ṣarf), rhetoric (balāgha), the occasions of revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl), the abrogating and abrogated verses (nāsikh wa mansūkh), the sciences of variant readings (qirāʾāt), and the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). Without these tools, he held, a person has no right to venture into the explanation of Allāh's word.

He further observed that the Qurʾān al-Sharīf is a book of definitive certainty (yaqīnī). Its general injunctions are definite (qaṭʿī), while some of its detailed applications may involve scholarly interpretation. Allāh's sacred text is free of every sort of conjecture and doubt — and our scholars have spent lives bringing those who raise doubts back to the Qurʾān's luminous guidance.

Commentary on the Verse of the Test of Ibrāhīm (Q. 2:124)

One of the Qurʾānic passages on which Ḥaḍrat gives an extended exposition is the verse in Sūrat al-Baqara concerning the testing of the Prophet Ibrāhīm (ʿalayhi al-salām) and his elevation to the rank of imām (leader of humanity):

وَإِذِ ابْتَلَىٰ إِبْرَاهِيمَ رَبُّهُ بِكَلِمَاتٍ فَأَتَمَّهُنَّ ۖ قَالَ إِنِّي جَاعِلُكَ لِلنَّاسِ إِمَامًا ۖ قَالَ وَمِن ذُرِّيَّتِي ۖ قَالَ لَا يَنَالُ عَهْدِي الظَّالِمِينَ

"And when his Lord tested Ibrāhīm with certain commands and he fulfilled them all, He said: 'I am making you a leader (imām) for humankind.' He asked: 'And from my descendants?' He replied: 'My covenant does not reach the wrongdoers.'" (Q. 2:124)

Ḥaḍrat begins with the word waʾidhibtalā — "and when He tested." He explains: when Allāh put Ibrāhīm to a series of trials by commands — leaving his family in the barren valley, building the Kaʿba, preparing to sacrifice his son Ismāʿīl (ʿalayhi al-salām) — and Ibrāhīm fulfilled every one of them with complete obedience and submission, without asking why, Allāh elevated him to imāma (leadership) over humankind. Ibrāhīm (ʿalayhi al-salām) then prayed that this office be continued in his descendants, and Allāh replied that the wrongdoers would not receive it.

Ḥaḍrat explains that three terms in this verse carry great import: imām — a leader who guides people, whether a prophet, a messenger, or a learned scholar and teacher; ʿahd (covenant) — here meaning the divine commission, appointment, and testament to lead; ẓālim (wrongdoer) — one who wrongs his own soul through unbelief or sin, or who wrongs others through oppression. The divine pronouncement is unambiguous: this sacred office of imāma shall not reach those who have oppressed and wronged themselves or others.

In the great journey of prophethood, what issue arises concerning the offspring of Ismāʿīl (ʿalayhi al-salām)? Among them was born the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ — the most deserving person to receive this Ibrāhīmic prayer. Allāh answered: "From your offspring I will make one worthy of that Ibrāhīmic prayer." The Prophet ﷺ said: "I am the duʿāʾ of my ancestor Ibrāhīm." Then Ibrāhīm (ʿalayhi al-salām) completed his words — saying, among other things to his Lord: "I shall fashion for the people a leader." Then Allāh said: "Those who wrong themselves and others shall not attain my covenant." The Prophet ﷺ then said to the offspring of Ismāʿīl: "I am the one from your lineage who carries Allāh's blessing — so protect him and be grateful to him, and I shall be an advocate for you with God."

Commentary on the Verse of Ritual Ablution (Q. 5:6)

Ḥaḍrat devoted sustained and meticulous attention to the verse of wuḍūʾ (ritual ablution) and tayammum (dry ablution) in Sūrat al-Māʾida. His treatment is an outstanding specimen of combining linguistic precision, jurisprudential depth, and practical guidance. The verse reads:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِذَا قُمْتُمْ إِلَى الصَّلَاةِ فَاغْسِلُوا وُجُوهَكُمْ وَأَيْدِيَكُمْ إِلَى الْمَرَافِقِ وَامْسَحُوا بِرُءُوسِكُمْ وَأَرْجُلَكُمْ إِلَى الْكَعْبَيْنِ ۚ وَإِن كُنتُمْ جُنُبًا فَاطَّهَّرُوا ۚ وَإِن كُنتُم مَّرْضَىٰ أَوْ عَلَىٰ سَفَرٍ أَوْ جَاءَ أَحَدٌ مِّنكُم مِّنَ الْغَائِطِ أَوْ لَامَسْتُمُ النِّسَاءَ فَلَمْ تَجِدُوا مَاءً فَتَيَمَّمُوا صَعِيدًا طَيِّبًا فَامْسَحُوا بِوُجُوهِكُمْ وَأَيْدِيكُم مِّنْهُ ۚ مَا يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ لِيَجْعَلَ عَلَيْكُم مِّنْ حَرَجٍ وَلَٰكِن يُرِيدُ لِيُطَهِّرَكُمْ وَلِيُتِمَّ نِعْمَتَهُ عَلَيْكُمْ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَشْكُرُونَ

O you who believe! When you rise for prayer, wash your faces and your hands up to the elbows, wipe your heads, and wash your feet up to the ankles. If you are in a state of major impurity (janāba), purify yourselves fully. If you are ill, or travelling, or one of you has come from the privy, or you have had contact with women, and you find no water, then resort to clean earth and wipe your faces and your hands with it. Allāh does not wish to place any hardship upon you; rather He wishes to purify you and to complete His favour upon you — so that you may be grateful. (Q. 5:6, Tafsīr Ṣiddīqī)

Yā ayyuhā alladhīna āmanū: O you who believe. Idhā qumtum ilā al-ṣalāt: When you rise toward the prayer. The word qāma here means: when you intend, resolve upon, and proceed toward performing the prayer. Faghsilū wujūhakum: Wash your faces. Washing (ghusl) means: water flowing over the limb so that it drips and runs. The face (wajh) extends from the hairline to the chin, and from one earlobe to the other. What lies beyond these boundaries is not part of the face for wuḍūʾ purposes.

Wa aydiyakum ilā al-marāfiq: and your hands up to the elbows. The hand comprises everything from the fingertips to the elbow. The elbows must be included in the washing according to Imām Abū Ḥanīfa (raḥimahu'llāh), and this is also the view of Imām al-Shāfiʿī and Imām Mālik (raḥimahumullāh). The particle ilā (up to) here means "up to and including," because the elbow is the point that defines the upper boundary of the arm-limb.

Wamsa-ḥū biruʾūsikum: Wipe your heads. Masḥ (wiping) is lighter than washing: one moistens the hand and passes it over the part without water flowing. The obligatory minimum: Ḥanafī scholars — wiping one quarter of the head; Imām al-Shāfiʿī — even one strand of hair; Imām Mālik — the whole head; Imām Aḥmad — most of the head. The letter bāʾ in biruʾūsikum indicates a partitive restriction (tabʿīḍ) according to some scholars, hence one quarter.

Wa arjulakum ilā al-kaʿbayn: and your feet up to the ankles. The reading of this phrase as accusative (nasb) — joining it to the command to wash the hands — indicates that washing the feet is obligatory. The reading as genitive (jarr) — making it parallel to the head-wiping — would indicate wiping. The Ḥanafī school, along with the other three schools, holds washing is obligatory, based on the established and continuous practice of the Prophet ﷺ and the Companions. Wiping as a substitute is the view of certain Shīʿa scholars and is contrary to the Sunnah.

Wa in kuntum junuban faṭṭahharū: If you are in a state of major ritual impurity (janāba), purify yourselves fully. Janāba arises from two causes: marital union and seminal emission. Full purification (ghusl) is obligatory in both cases.

For tayammum: fatyamammū ṣaʿīdan ṭayyibā — resort to clean earth. Ṣaʿīd means the surface of the ground. Ṭayyib means pure and clean. One strikes the clean earth and wipes the face and then the hands. The number of strokes: one strike or two? The Ḥanafī position is two strikes — one for the face and one for the forearms up to the elbows. Imām al-Shāfiʿī says two. The more directly transmitted practice is one. Ḥaḍrat notes: the statement of Allāh — mā yurīdu Allāhu li-yajʿala ʿalaykum min ḥaraj — "Allāh does not wish to place any hardship upon you" — is the greatest principle of facilitation in Islamic law.

Ḥaḍrat further explains: how many strokes for the hands? The Ḥanafī position — up to the elbows; the Shāfiʿī — also up to the elbows; the Mālikī — up to the wrists; and there is a well-known narration that the Prophet ﷺ performed tayammum once and wiped the face and then the backs of the hands up to the wrists. The principle is: mā yurīdu Allāhu — this is the foundation of facilitation and mercy.

The Nature of Prophethood and Infallibility (ʿIṣma)

Ḥaḍrat discusses the nature of prophethood (nubuwwa) at length in his Tafsīr. He writes: The Prophet ﷺ is from among us as human beings. Allāh declares:

لَقَدْ جَاءَكُمْ رَسُولٌ مِّنْ أَنفُسِكُمْ عَزِيزٌ عَلَيْهِ مَا عَنِتُّمْ حَرِيصٌ عَلَيْكُم بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ رَءُوفٌ رَّحِيمٌ

There has come to you a Messenger from among yourselves; it grieves him that you should suffer any hardship, he is anxious over you, and with the believers he is full of kindness and mercy. (Q. 9:128)

Ḥaḍrat explains: the Prophet ﷺ is a human being — he walked in the marketplace, he ate food, he experienced the needs of the human body. This is not a deficiency; it is a perfection. For the mission of the Prophet is to be a model for all human beings. If he were an angel, people would say: "But we are not angels — his example is not binding upon us." Since he is a human being, his example is binding upon all of humanity. The great miracle lies in this: despite being human, he attained such a degree of proximity to Allāh that he received revelation directly.

On the question of ʿiṣma (prophetic infallibility) and ḥifāẓa (preservation of the saints from sin): Ḥaḍrat explains that ʿiṣma is the property of prophets alone. It means that Allāh protects His prophets from error in conveying the divine message — so that the proof to the Ummah is established with certainty. The saints (awliyāʾ) possess ḥifāẓa — a degree of divine preservation — not infallibility. The saints may err. But by the grace of Allāh they may be preserved from major sins. The difference between the two must be maintained clearly.

Commentary on the Verse of Intercession and the Afterlife

Ḥaḍrat discusses the hadith narrated in Kanz al-ʿUmmāl about the spiritual life of ʿĀʾisha (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhā) and the question of īṣāl al-thawāb (conveying the reward of good deeds to the deceased). He brings the following ḥadīth:

عَنْ عَائِشَةَ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهَا أَنَّ رَجُلًا قَالَ لِلنَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: إِنَّ أُمِّي افْتُلِتَتْ نَفْسُهَا وَأَظُنُّهَا لَوْ تَكَلَّمَتْ تَصَدَّقَتْ، فَهَلْ لَهَا أَجْرٌ إِنْ تَصَدَّقْتُ عَنْهَا؟ قَالَ: نَعَمْ

Narrated from ʿĀʾisha (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhā): A man said to the Prophet ﷺ: "My mother died suddenly, and I believe that had she had the chance to speak she would have given charity. Will she have a reward if I give charity on her behalf?" He said: "Yes." (Agreed upon)

And the hadith from Ibn ʿAbbās (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhumā):

A man came to the Prophet ﷺ and said: "My mother has died. She used to fast one day every month as a vow. Shall I fast on her behalf?" The Prophet ﷺ replied: "Yes, fast on her behalf." Another asked about the prayer; the Prophet ﷺ replied: "Pray on their behalf." ()

On the basis of these aḥādīth, Ḥaḍrat establishes that conveying the reward of good deeds to the deceased is valid and confirmed by ḥadīth. He refutes those who claim that the Fātiḥa recited for the deceased does not reach them. He writes in his tafsīr of Sūrat al-Fātiḥa: "Is standing in front and reciting the Fātiḥa the proof of conveying reward? Well, the Fātiḥa is read in the right direction — and reciting it facing someone in the qibla direction again and again — what does it mean? It is apparent that the best acts are those which are done perpetually, which are repeated, and which never end." He further notes that calling out "Yā Rasūla'llāh" is not polytheism — and there are narrations for this from Tirmidhī, Nasāʾī, Ibn Khuzayma, and Ḥākim.

He then reproduces the famous supplication of tawassul through the Prophet ﷺ:

اللَّهُمَّ إِنِّي أَسْأَلُكَ وَأَتَوَجَّهُ إِلَيْكَ بِحَبِيبِكَ الْمُصْطَفَى يَا مُحَمَّد؛ إِنَّا نَتَوَسَّلُ بِكَ إِلَى رَبِّكَ فَاشْفَعْ لَنَا عِنْدَ الْمَوْلَى الْعَظِيمِ، يَا نِعْمَ الرَّسُولُ الطَّاهِرُ، اللَّهُمَّ شَفِّعْهُ فِينَا بِجَاهِهِ عِنْدَكَ

O Allāh, I ask You and direct my face toward You through Your beloved, the Chosen One. O Muḥammad — we seek intercession through you to our Lord. Grant us intercession before the Exalted Master. O how noble is the pure Messenger! O Allāh, grant him intercession on our behalf by virtue of his station with You.

Ḥaḍrat notes: Look — this supplication is addressed in the name of "Yā Muḥammad." Is it polytheism (shirk) to call out "Yā Muḥammad"? By no means. This is tawassul — seeking nearness to Allāh through the intermediary of the Prophet's rank and love. The names of Allāh are called upon, the Prophet is addressed as an intermediary (wasīla), and this is the transmitted and established way of the Companions and the early scholars. Ḥaḍrat ʿUthmān ibn Ḥanīf (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu) himself taught this form of address, and Ḥaḍrat quotes it in his discussion of the verse of wasīla.

He adds: Look also at the call of Ḥaḍrat Ḥusayn (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu) to lost travellers: "We call out — Yā Muḥammadāh! Yā Muḥammadāh! We are lost — guide us. O servants of Allāh — help us! O Ghawth! O Khwāja! O Naqshbandī! O Bādawī! O Shādhilī — help us!" — this is the living call of the lovers of the Prophet ﷺ. It is the adab (etiquette) of love and longing.

He quotes the Persian couplet of Saʿdī (raḥimahu'llāh):

خلاف پیمبر کے رہ گزید

Whoever treads a path contrary to the Prophet

کہ ہرگز بمنزل نہ خواہد رسید

Shall never arrive at the destination.

Commentary on Verses with Divine Attributes

Ḥaḍrat treats in detail several Qurʾānic verses that appear to describe Allāh with attributes analogous to human characteristics (mutashābihāt). His approach is firmly in line with the Māturīdī and Ashʿarī mainstream: the verses are to be understood via tanzīh (transcendence) — Allāh is free from any resemblance to creation. Those who take such expressions in a corporeal, literalist sense are in error. Among the examples discussed:

1. Yad Allāhi fawqa aydīhim (Q. 48:10) — "The hand of Allāh is over their hands": this refers to the bayʿa (pledge of allegiance) — it is as if Allāh Himself is over the pledge of those who pledge to His Prophet ﷺ.
2. Thumma istawā ʿalā al-ʿarsh (Q. 7:53, 20:5) — "Then He established Himself upon the Throne": the meaning is that His sovereignty (mulk) became manifest and fully established; a corporeal sitting cannot be attributed to Allāh.
3. Allāhu yastahzīʾu bihim (Q. 2:15) — "Allāh mocks them": the meaning is that Allāh shall recompense their mockery — the outcome, not the emotion, is intended.
4. Wa ghaḍiba Allāhu ʿalayhim (Q. 48:6) — "Allāh became angry with them": the intended meaning is the punishment that is the result of anger, not any inner agitation.
5. Wa makarū wa makara Allāh (Q. 3:54) — "They schemed and Allāh schemed": Allāh foils their scheme and requites it in full measure.

Ḥaḍrat then expounds the key Qurʾānic principle governing such verses:

هُوَ الَّذِي أَنزَلَ عَلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ مِنْهُ آيَاتٌ مُّحْكَمَاتٌ هُنَّ أُمُّ الْكِتَابِ وَأُخَرُ مُتَشَابِهَاتٌ ۖ فَأَمَّا الَّذِينَ فِي قُلُوبِهِمْ زَيْغٌ فَيَتَّبِعُونَ مَا تَشَابَهَ مِنْهُ ابْتِغَاءَ الْفِتْنَةِ وَابْتِغَاءَ تَأْوِيلِهِ ۗ وَمَا يَعْلَمُ تَأْوِيلَهُ إِلَّا اللَّهُ ۗ وَالرَّاسِخُونَ فِي الْعِلْمِ يَقُولُونَ آمَنَّا بِهِ كُلٌّ مِّنْ عِندِ رَبِّنَا

He it is who has sent down to you the Book — in it are firm, unambiguous verses, they are the mother of the Book — and others that are allegorical. Those in whose hearts is a deviation follow the allegorical part, seeking sedition and an interpretation to suit them. None knows the true interpretation save Allāh — and those firm in knowledge say: We believe in it; all of it is from our Lord. (Q. 3:7)

The Qurʾān also contains in some places attributes that are descriptions of certain human qualities — used of Allāh as a metaphor (majāz). Examples: (1) Yad Allāhi fawqa aydīhim (Q. 48:10); (2) Thumma istawā ʿalā al-ʿarsh (Q. 7:53); (3) Al-Raḥmānu ʿalā al-ʿarshi istawā (Q. 20:5); (4) Allāhu yastahzīʾu bihim (Q. 2:15); (5) Wa ghaḍiba Allāhu ʿalayhim (Q. 48:6); (6) Wa makarū wa makara Allāhu (Q. 3:54). In each case the meaning must be given in line with the majesty and transcendence of Allāh. For some scholars go silent on these — saying the purpose of Allāh is understood — while others, following Arab linguistic conventions and the methods of Ḥaḍrat and his school, give each its appropriate intended meaning.

Striving in Allāh's Path — Commentary on Q. 5:35

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ وَابْتَغُوا إِلَيْهِ الْوَسِيلَةَ وَجَاهِدُوا فِي سَبِيلِهِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ

O you who believe — fear Allāh and seek a means of approach (wasīla) to Him, and strive hard in His path; perhaps you will succeed. (Q. 5:35)

Ḥaḍrat's commentary on this verse is particularly detailed. He explains: "O believers, adopt taqwā (God-consciousness — reverential fear of Allāh). Guard yourselves from whatever earns His displeasure. Suppress base impulses and ignoble desires. Keep your hearts clean from the devils of temptation. Guard against sins: bribery, usury, deception, arrogance, self-love. Keep to wholesome words and deeds. Until the heart is purified, the Beloved will not come into sight."

Then seek a wasīla — every means of drawing close to Allāh is a wasīla: prayer, fasting, zakāt, pilgrimage, all forms of good deed. The greatest means is love of the Prophet ﷺ and adherence to his Sunnah, confirmed by many aḥādīth. And calling upon the Prophet ﷺ by name is a well-established form of tawassul in the Ummah from the earliest times.

Then strive hard (jāhidū) — struggle with full being in Allāh's path. Give your life, time, wealth, and effort on that path. The word jihād includes every type of effort made in obedience to Allāh and in service of His religion — not merely armed combat. Perhaps you will succeed — it is the hope of every believer that his striving will open the door of success before him.

Topic Eight: Service of Ḥadīth and Fiqh

خدمتِ حدیث وفقہ

Ḥaḍrat's teachers for the study of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī — from whom he read it and received authoritative transmission (riwāya) — were three:

1. Mawlānā Alī Bakhsh Aẓīmābādī (raḥimahu'llāh)
2. Mawlānā Muḥammad Hāshim (raḥimahu'llāh)
3. Ḥaḍrat's own father, Mawlānā Shaykh ʿAbd al-Qādir Ṣiddīqī (raḥimahu'llāh)

All three teachers traced their chains of riwāya back to Shāh Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm, known as Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī (raḥimahu'llāh), the great reviver of the Ḥadīth sciences in the Indian Subcontinent. The chain is:

Shāh Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm (Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī)
↓
Shāh Muḥammad Isḥāq
↓ (three branches)
Shāh ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Dihlī · Shāh Aḥmad Saʿīd · Nadhīr Ḥusayn Dihlawī
↓ ↓ ↓
Shaykh ʿAbd al-Qādir Ṣiddīqī · Muḥammad Hāshim · Alī Bakhsh Aẓīmābādī
↓
Baḥr al-ʿUlūm ʿAllāma Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Ṣiddīqī

Through Ḥaḍrat Abū al-Ṭāhir, he also received riwāya of the following canonical collections: (1) Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, (2) Sunan Abī Dāwūd, (3) Sunan al-Ṣughrā of al-Nasāʾī, (4) Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī, (5) Sunan Ibn Māja, (6) Muwaṭṭaʾ Imām Mālik.

Ḥaḍrat used to say: "Whoever wishes to study Ḥadīth must first study Fiqh." He meant: if a person reads Ḥadīth without knowledge of Fiqh, the meaning of the Ḥadīth will not become clear to him. If someone reads Ḥadīth without Fiqh he may inadvertently declare something ḥarām as ḥalāl or ḥalāl as ḥarām, and both he and others will go astray. He also said: "Never do research without verification — who will do the research? Whoever is given real understanding of the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth and their objectives by Allāh."

Ḥaḍrat's Book Miʿyār al-Kalām — The Sciences of Ḥadīth

Ḥaḍrat's important work Miʿyār al-Kalām contains a comprehensive treatment of the sciences of Ḥadīth and the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. His framework covers the following topics:

A. The Narrator (Rāwī) and his conditions:
The conditions of a narrator are: (1) intellect (ʿaql), (2) integrity (ʿadāla), (3) Islam, (4) worldly affairs (umūr dunyawī).
— Precision (ḍabṭ): The narrator must have heard the narration properly, preserved it, and transmitted it accurately.
— Integrity (ʿadāla): The narrator must be pious, truthful, and morally upright.
— Islam: The narrator must maintain belief in Allāh and the Prophet ﷺ in its general form.

B. Categories of Khabar (the Ḥadīth report):
Khabar, sunnah, and ḥadīth are approximately synonymous terms.
Khabar by type: (1) Verbal (qawlī), (2) Practical (fiʿlī), (3) Tacit approbation (taqrīrī).
— Verbal: What the Prophet ﷺ said.
— Practical: What the Prophet ﷺ did.
— Tacit approbation: What was done or said in his presence and he did not prohibit or correct it.

C. By degree of certainty (yaqīn and ẓann):
Mutawātir: Reported in every generation by so many people that their agreement on a lie is rationally impossible. A mutawātir report produces definitive certainty (yaqīn) and obligates both belief and practice.
Āḥād: Reports not reaching tawātur; these produce probable knowledge (ẓann). Types of āḥād: (1) Mashhūr (well-known — three or more narrators in every generation), (2) ʿAzīz (narrated by two in any generation), (3) Gharīb (narrated by a single narrator in any generation).

D. By authenticity and weakness:
(1) Ṣaḥīḥ (sound): Continuous chain from the Prophet ﷺ, every narrator fully meets conditions.
(2) Ḥasan (fair): Like ṣaḥīḥ but with one or more narrators slightly below the full ṣaḥīḥ standard.
(3) Ḍaʿīf (weak): One or more of the required conditions is absent in a narrator.

Weak ḥadīths by degree of defect: (1) Mawḍūʿ (fabricated — the narrator is a liar), (2) Matrūk (abandoned), (3) Munkar (reprehensible), (4) Maʿrūf (its opposite), (5) Shādhdh (anomalous).

E. Connectivity and disconnection (ittiṣāl wa inqiṭāʿ) of chains:
(1) Marfūʿ: Continuous chain from the Prophet ﷺ (his words, deeds, approbations).
(2) Mawqūf: Ending at a Companion.
(3) Maqṭūʿ: Ending at a Follower (Tābiʿī).
(4) Munqaṭiʿ: A narrator missing from the beginning.
(5) Mursal: A Companion's name is missing.
(6) Muʿḍal: Two or more narrators missing consecutively.
(7) Munqaṭiʿ: A single narrator missing somewhere in the chain.
Note: According to Imām Abū Ḥanīfa (raḥimahu'llāh), a mursal ḥadīth is also valid and may be used as evidence.

F. Jarḥ wa Taʿdīl (critique of narrators):
The person performing this critique must be: a learned scholar, just, impartial, and free of bias.
Terms of approval (taʿdīl): thiqa (trustworthy), ḥujja (proof), ṣadūq (truthful), ṣāliḥ (sound), lā baʾsa bihi (no objection to him), shaykh, ḥasan al-ḥadīth.
Terms of disparagement (jarḥ): kadhdhāb (liar), dajjāl, wāhī (feeble), sāqiṭ (discredited), lā shayʾ (nothing), munkar al-ḥadīth (his hadith is reprehensible).
If jarḥ and taʿdīl conflict, jarḥ generally takes precedence. However, a general unqualified disparagement is not necessarily final — and some scholars give preference to unqualified approval as well.

The Obligation to Preserve and Transmit Knowledge

Among the aḥādīth that Ḥaḍrat cited frequently was the following, from ʿAbd Allāh ibn Masʿūd (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu):

عَنِ ابْنِ مَسْعُودٍ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ نَضَّرَ اللَّهُ امْرَءًا سَمِعَ مِنَّا شَيْئًا فَبَلَّغَهُ كَمَا سَمِعَ فَرُبَّ مُبَلِّغٍ أَوْعَى مِنْ سَامِعٍ

Narrated from Ibn Masʿūd (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu): The Messenger of Allāh ﷺ said: "May Allāh illuminate the face of a person who hears something from us, then conveys it exactly as he heard it — for many a conveyor has a better grasp than the one who first heard it." (Tirmidhī, reported also as marfūʿ — Tirmidhī, vol. 2, p. 93)

And the ḥadīth of Abū Rāfiʿ:

عَنْ أَبِي رَافِعٍ قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ لَا أُلْفِيَنَّ أَحَدَكُمْ مُتَّكِئًا عَلَى أَرِيكَتِهِ يَأْتِيهِ الأَمْرُ مِنْ أَمْرِي مِمَّا أَمَرْتُ بِهِ أَوْ نَهَيْتُ عَنْهُ فَيَقُولُ لَا أَدْرِي مَا وَجَدْنَا فِي كِتَابِ اللَّهِ اتَّبَعْنَاهُ

Narrated from Abū Rāfiʿ: The Messenger of Allāh ﷺ said: "I do not want to find any of you reclining on his couch while a matter comes to him regarding my commands — what I have ordered or prohibited — and he says: 'I do not know; whatever we find in the Book of Allāh, that we will follow.'" (Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja, and al-Bayhaqī in Dalāʾil al-Nubuwwa — Mishkāt)

And the ḥadīth of al-Miqdam ibn Maʿdī Karb:

عَنِ الْمِقْدَامِ بْنِ مَعْدِيكَرِبَ قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَلَا إِنِّي أُوتِيتُ الْقُرْآنَ وَمِثْلَهُ مَعَهُ أَلَا يُوشِكُ رَجُلٌ شَبْعَانُ عَلَى أَرِيكَتِهِ يَقُولُ عَلَيْكُمْ بِهَذَا الْقُرْآنِ فَمَا وَجَدْتُمْ فِيهِ مِنْ حَلَالٍ فَأَحِلُّوهُ وَمَا وَجَدْتُمْ فِيهِ مِنْ حَرَامٍ فَحَرِّمُوهُ

Narrated from al-Miqdam ibn Maʿdī Karb: The Messenger of Allāh ﷺ said: "Lo! I have been given the Qurʾān and something similar to it alongside it. Beware! A time will come when a man reclining on his couch will say: 'Stick to this Qurʾān alone — whatever you find in it as ḥalāl, declare it ḥalāl; whatever you find as ḥarām, declare it ḥarām.'" (Abū Dāwūd, also narrated in Ibn Māja and al-Dārimī — Mishkāt)

Ḥaḍrat explains: These aḥādīth make it clear that the Islamic legal order is built on the Qurʾān and the Sunnah together, and that the Sunnah (ḥadīth) is in truth the detailed explanation (tafsīl) of the Qurʾān. The first source of Islamic law is the Qurʾān, and after the Qurʾān comes the Sunnah — and after the Sunnah comes Ijmāʿ (consensus) and qiyās (analogical reasoning).

The First Source of Islamic Law Is the Qurʾān

Ḥaḍrat writes in Miʿyār al-Kalām: The Islamic legal order has its first and primary source in the Qurʾān. In the Qurʾān, Allāh has issued commands — ṣallū (pray), usjudū (prostrate), ātū al-zakāt (give zakāt) — but the details of how, when, and in what manner are explained by the Sunnah. The Sunnah explains and gives specifics; it does not exist as an independent parallel source alongside the Qurʾān but as its definitive, necessary exposition. The Qurʾān's general commands remain general principles; the Sunnah gives them their practical, detailed application in every instance. Allāh Himself has commanded obedience to the Sunnah:

وَمَا آتَاكُمُ الرَّسُولُ فَخُذُوهُ وَمَا نَهَاكُمْ عَنْهُ فَانتَهُوا

Whatever the Messenger gives you, take it; and whatever he forbids you, refrain from it. (Q. 59:7, al-Ḥashr)

وَمَا يَنطِقُ عَنِ الْهَوَىٰ ۚ إِنْ هُوَ إِلَّا وَحْيٌ يُوحَىٰ

Nor does he speak from personal desire; it is nothing but revealed revelation. (Q. 53:3–4, al-Najm)

لَّقَدْ كَانَ لَكُمْ فِي رَسُولِ اللَّهِ أُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ

There has certainly been for you in the Messenger of Allāh a noble example. (Q. 33:21, al-Aḥzāb)

After the Qurʾān, the Sunnah's rank as an independent source of legislation — even in matters on which the Qurʾān is silent — is established by these verses and by numerous aḥādīth, including the foregoing traditions of Ibn Masʿūd, Abū Rāfiʿ, and al-Miqdam ibn Maʿdī Karb.

Ijmāʿ (Scholarly Consensus) — The Third Source

Ḥaḍrat explains that after the Qurʾān and Sunnah, the third source of Islamic law is Ijmāʿ (consensus of the mujtahidīn — qualified scholars of independent reasoning). He says: Ijmāʿ is the agreement of all the scholars of the Ummah of Muḥammad ﷺ on any particular matter in a particular age.

The status of Ijmāʿ: Ijmāʿ is not intrinsically binding in itself but derives its authority from Allāh's command. There is no specific prescribed number for Ijmāʿ — it is not required that a specific number of scholars agree. The rule of Ijmāʿ: Ijmāʿ does not by itself create a new independent ruling — it confirms the certainty of a ruling or lifts ambiguity about it. Opposing Ijmāʿ is not permissible.

The constituents (arkān) of Ijmāʿ: Two kinds: (1) Ijmāʿ ʿazīma (strict consensus), (2) Ijmāʿ rukhṣa (consensus of ease). Ijmāʿ ʿazīma is of two kinds: (1) Ijmāʿ bi-l-qawl (consensus of word — all scholars of Ijmāʿ agree verbally), (2) Ijmāʿ bi-l-fiʿl (consensus of deed — all scholars adopt a practice). Ijmāʿ rukhṣa: some people agree by word or deed while the rest remain silent. This is also called Ijmāʿ. (An example: Imām al-Shāfiʿī (raḥimahu'llāh) has the silence of those present as the proof of agreement.)

The qualifications for those performing Ijmāʿ: Those who form Ijmāʿ must be qualified mujtahidīn — not sinners (fāsiq).

The ranks of Ijmāʿ:
(1) Ijmāʿ qaṭʿī mujibu takfīr: Denying this consensus brings one close to kufr — because this type of consensus denies an essential requirement of the religion. For example, denying the consensus on the caliphate of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu).
(2) Ijmāʿ qaṭʿī ghayr mujibu takfīr: This type of consensus denies an established ruling — but the person who denies it is not necessarily a disbeliever, rather he is considered an interpreter who gives ta'wīl.
(3) Ijmāʿ mujibu ṭumʾanīna: A consensus after the era of the Companions, arrived at by a method in which the condition of this particular ruling involves certainty of not being associated with unbelief by the ijmāʿ — because all the Muslims in the community came to believe in it through the ages.
(4) Ijmāʿ mujibu ẓann: Where various mujtahidīn perform a single act on a single occasion — it is a consensus; but performing this Ijmāʿ on a given problem is a presumptive argument (ḥujja ẓanniyya).

Conditions of Ijmāʿ:
— The agreement must occur in a single time among mujtahidīn on a particular legal ruling.
— After formation, Ijmāʿ cannot be reviewed by any subsequent mujtahid.
— There is no fixed required number of qualified scholars for Ijmāʿ.
— The transmission of Ijmāʿ is of three types: (1) by tawātur (mass transmission), (2) by mashhūr (well-known transmission), (3) by āḥād (solitary transmission).
— Ijmāʿ by tawātur is definitive; practice and belief are obligatory.
— Ijmāʿ by mashhūr is close to tawātur.
— Ijmāʿ by āḥād obligates practice but not definitive certainty (yaqīn).
— The evidence (sanad) for Ijmāʿ: Ijmāʿ without a legal evidence is not sound. The evidence of Ijmāʿ is: Qurʾān, Ḥadīth, and qiyās.
— The value of Ijmāʿ: it upgrades a probable ruling to a certain one. Some scholars say that establishing a matter on Ijmāʿ is an extremely difficult task.

Qiyās (Analogical Reasoning) — The Fourth Source

The fourth source of Islamic jurisprudence is qiyās. After the Qurʾān, Sunnah, and Ijmāʿ come the evidences of the legal scholar (faqīh) — and then qiyās. But in the domain of individual ijtihād (independent juristic reasoning), qiyās comes after all of these. The main reason its domain is limited is that the agreed-upon matters of the early scholars are relatively few and far between. The consultation of scholars in general is still a necessity today. But every mujtahid is unable to agree on any single ruling on Ijmāʿ without being well-grounded in the Qurʾān, the Sunnah, and the Fiqh. A mujtahid's every judgment is against his use of blind conjecture — and analogy to precedent without authority is not possible.

Ḥaḍrat explains two types of qiyās in his Kitāb al-Dīn: (1) al-qiyās fī al-qiyās bi-ghayr al-wajh al-sharʿī (qiyās conducted without a valid legal basis — i.e., that used for religious matters by one's own uninformed judgment); (2) al-qiyās fī al-qiyās bi-al-wajh al-sharʿī (qiyās conducted with a valid legal basis — legitimate analogical reasoning in jurisprudence). The second is legitimate, established, and authoritative.

The first type — qiyās without a legal basis:

قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِ عِلْمٌ ۚ إِنَّ السَّمْعَ وَالْبَصَرَ وَالْفُؤَادَ كُلُّ أُولَٰئِكَ كَانَ عَنْهُ مَسْئُولًا

And do not pursue what you have no knowledge of; indeed the hearing, the sight, and the heart — each of these will be questioned. (Q. 17:36, Banī Isrāʾīl)

مَنْ قَالَ فِي الدِّينِ بِرَأْيِهِ فَقَدِ اتَّهَمَنِي

Whoever speaks about the religion on the basis of his own opinion has accused me [of being unclear]. (al-Daylamī from Abū Dharr — Kanz)

لَا تَقِيسُوا فِي الدِّينِ فَإِنَّ الدِّينَ لَا يُقَاسُ وَأَوَّلُ مَنْ قَاسَ إِبْلِيسُ

Do not make analogies in the religion, for the religion cannot be subjected to analogy — and the first to make an analogy was Iblīs. (al-Daylamī from ʿAlī — Kanz)

مَنْ قَاسَ حَدِيثِي بِرَأْيِهِ فَقَدِ اتَّهَمَنِي

Whoever measures my ḥadīth against his own opinion has accused me. (al-Daylamī from Anas)

Ḥaḍrat explains: By these aḥādīth, those who apply qiyās without a legal basis — using uninformed personal reason in religious matters — are clearly condemned. The person who sets aside the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth and uses his own opinion as a starting point resembles Iblīs in his era. Iblīs applied qiyās — fire versus clay, and by this analogy concluded he was superior. The Imāms of Fiqh have used legitimate, authoritative qiyās, and we are directed toward the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth as primary — not personal conjecture.

The second type — qiyās with a valid legal basis (bi-al-wajh al-sharʿī):

فَاعْتَبِرُوا يَا أُولِي الْأَبْصَارِ

Take heed, O you who possess insight. (Q. 59:2, al-Ḥashr)

أَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ الْقُرْآنَ وَلَوْ كَانَ مِنْ عِندِ غَيْرِ اللَّهِ لَوَجَدُوا فِيهِ اخْتِلَافًا كَثِيرًا

Do they not ponder the Qurʾān? Had it been from other than Allāh, they would have found in it much contradiction. (Q. 4:82, al-Nisāʾ)

وَلَوْ رَدُّوهُ إِلَى الرَّسُولِ وَإِلَىٰ أُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْهُمْ لَعَلِمَهُ الَّذِينَ يَسْتَنبِطُونَهُ مِنْهُمْ

Had they referred it to the Messenger and to those of authority among them, those of them who are able to derive conclusions would have known its meaning. (Q. 4:83, al-Nisāʾ)

وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا

Those who strive hard in Our cause — We shall certainly guide them to Our paths. (Q. 29:69, al-ʿAnkabūt)

Ḥaḍrat writes: Allāh the Exalted commands: O you of insight — take heed. Go from the apparent to the inner, from the general to the specific, seek out the purpose, derive principles, and grasp the objectives. Are you not reflecting on the Qurʾān? And Allāh commands: refer to the Messenger ﷺ and those in authority. The scholars among them — the people of knowledge — will extract the meaning. And Allāh also promises: those who strive hard for Us, We will guide them.

The Tafsīr Ṣiddīqī presents these discussions of qiyās, its types, and its conditions in detail under both relevant chapter headings. The chapter on qiyās without legal basis gives the above aḥādīth under the title "al-Qiyās bi-ghayr al-wajh al-sharʿī" — i.e. applying one's uninformed opinion to religious matters. Among the most famous such cases cited is the qiyās of Iblīs: Allāh commanded all of creation — the angels — to prostrate before Ādam (ʿalayhi al-salām). The angels prostrated; Iblīs refused. He applied qiyās: "I am made of fire, Ādam of clay — fire is superior to clay." This was an act of the gravest ignorance and arrogance. Allāh does not need to give reasons for His commands. Allāh's commands must be obeyed.

Scholars' Disagreements on Ijmāʿ

Ḥaḍrat devotes substantial discussion to the disagreements among the ʾaʾimma (leading scholars) on the question of Ijmāʿ. He writes:

"One fact is that a scholar (ʿālim) and an ignorant person cannot be equals — the work of a scholar does not proceed alongside the work of an ignorant person. So ask the scholars your questions. Ask them for their fatāwā and follow them in their rulings. Do not accept blindly without verification — seek Qurʾānic verses or Prophetic ḥadīth. We are engaged in resolving matters in all our affairs, and in our engagement we need to know how to proceed."

"An important point to keep in mind: the ijmāʿ of the scholars is that a leader (ḥākim) who is a mujtahid — if he arrives at a judgment, he will have reward — and if he arrives at a ruling and it is correct, he will have two rewards; and if he makes an effort (ijtihād) and is wrong, then one reward. (This ḥadīth was narrated by Abū Dāwūd and Nasāʾī.)"

The Development of Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh al-Islāmī)

Ḥaḍrat traces in detail the historical development of Islamic jurisprudence and its four great schools (madhāhib). His account in Miʿyār al-Kalām:

1. The Prophet ﷺ was a walking, living constitution for the Muslim community. From the moment of his commission as a prophet, his entire life was a continuous proclamation of tawḥīd (monotheism) and renunciation of shirk. His very existence was the living law; all the Qurʾān's injunctions were implemented through his blessed life and example. The Companions, living with him, took guidance directly from his presence, words, and actions at every moment.

2. During the Caliphate of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu) and ʿUmar al-Fārūq (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu), the Companions travelled widely as Islam spread to different lands and non-Arab peoples came into the fold. New and novel situations began to arise. For these, the Companions would first refer to the Qurʾān, then to the established Sunnah, and if they found no direct text they would turn to Ijmāʿ and qiyās — all the while setting the objectives, purposes, and limits of the Sharīʿa as the frame of reference.

3. Under the third caliph, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu), as the Companions spread to different regions in the final years of their lives, they carried with them the Islamic legal learning they had received and taught it to those around them in their regions — imparting both the practical benefits of their jurisprudential consultations and the subsidiary derivative rulings they had learned from the Prophet ﷺ and inferred for subsequent generations.

One of the great scholars of the Ummah writes: "Islamic jurisprudence came to be disseminated in this way — from Kūfa through ʿAbd Allāh ibn Masʿūd (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu), and from Medina through Zayd ibn Thābit (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu). Among the students of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Masʿūd were ʿAlqama and Aswad al-Nakhaʿī, and among the students of Zayd ibn Thābit were Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (one of the scholars of the mosque and a great jurist). And then came Imām Abū Ḥanīfa — who brought the jurisprudence of Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī to its culmination and from the Alī (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu) branch of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Masʿūd took a complete and comprehensive body of law." (Aʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn, vol. 1, p. 23)

As regards the transmission of Fiqh in Medina: Ḥaḍrat ʿUmar al-Fārūq intended to expand and systematise the Medina jurisprudence, and Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq was of the same intention. For this purpose, ʿUmar (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu) organised a special assembly (majlis) with the participation of prominent Companions in Medina. He invited the most distinguished tābiʿīn of that era — and among the notable members were: (1) ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAwf (a student of Zayd ibn Thābit through his joint practice with ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar), (2) a grandson of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, (3) a son of Zubayr ibn al-ʿAwwām.

Imām Abū Ḥanīfa left his era in his own time and travelled to many different cities of the Islamic world, teaching. And the scholarly circles of ʿAlī's (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu) household gave him a large measure of distinction. Similarly, from the students of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Masʿūd, Imām Mālik and Imām al-Shāfiʿī — who is also Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal's teacher. In the great work Tawsīʿ al-Fiqh, the author writes under the heading "Imām Abū Ḥanīfa's position."

Once a person came to challenge his ijtihād. The person objected: Are there not jurists who disagree with you? Imām Abū Ḥanīfa replied: "If I take the Qurʾān and act according to it, and if the Qurʾān does not have it I take the sound ḥadīth and act on it, and if I find a sound ḥadīth I take it and leave the statements of Companions where there is conflict among the Companions, I give preference to one over another — but I never abandon the statements of the Companions and go to others. When it comes to Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, al-Shaʿbī, Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Ibn Sīrīn, and Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyab — well, they were men who performed ijtihād, and so do I."

The Disagreements among the ʾAʾimma

Ḥaḍrat writes at length about the disagreements among the great Imāms of jurisprudence. He notes:

"The time that we live in — and the four schools and their institutions that have come down to us — show that scholarly disagreement takes the form of a particular personal stance. Their disagreement arises from their independent scholarly natures. Some are independent mujtahidīn with their own independent views. Their particular ijtihād has a particular method of argumentation. Some mujtahidīn within a school differ even from their original teachers. They exercise ijtihād in the secondary branches within their madhhab. The new question before the mujtahid: he can give the answer on the basis of the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth. No single ḥadīth that is authentically established can be rejected in its entirety — but the truthful guide of the ḥadīth is always there for him to follow. The scholars of the Aṣḥāb istinbāṭ (those who derive rulings) do not do personal research from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth — but in the rulings of their madhhab, they derive specific juristic consequences from its principles."

Some scholars are of the view — and this is noteworthy — that the persons of the four schools and their disciples, who have come to be counted among the ashāb al-fatwā (qualified for issuing religious rulings), have a particular individual stance. Their particular ijtihād has a particular form of argumentation. Some mujtahidīn in a school differ even from their original teachers on some subsidiary questions. They exercise personal ijtihād in the secondary branches. Ḥaḍrat adds: "Regrettably, the discord between the Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī schools has reached such a pitch in our time that in Baghdad there was once a mosque in which Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī worshippers each prayed separately — and in matters of khānagī (private family) religious affairs even non-Muslims begin to feel embarrassed."

The Criteria of Scholarship (Miʿyār al-Kalām — Scholarly Standards)

Ḥaḍrat writes in Miʿyār al-Kalām about the principles and categories of Fiqh:

ʿUqūd (contracts) — the measure of their validity depends not on mere words and phrases alone but on the purposeful intention (maqṣad). Every question must be resolved as it presents itself. The fixed (qadīm) is to preserve itself — the new (jadīd) does not give way to it. There will come a time when an established matter becomes fixed; and then there will arise something new regarding it that is established as well. Its use is agreed upon — contradicting it is not permissible. A single close similarity cannot be the basis of analogy. The second ijtihād does not negate the first. It is necessary for one mujtahid not to follow another mujtahid's ijtihād. There must be no harm and no counter-harm — one particular damage that is severe must be lifted, even at the cost of allowing a lesser damage. Two severe and pervasive damages must be prevented. The interest of the individual is sacrificed for the public good. The law of custom is firm.

These principles from Miʿyār al-Kalām display the scholarly precision of Ḥaḍrat's jurisprudential method — drawing from both the transmitted tradition and systematic legal reasoning.

Topic Nine: Further Service of Ḥadīth — Recording, Criticism, and Application

خدمتِ حدیث — تحریر، تنقید، و تطبیق

Ḥaḍrat discusses at length the history of the recording of Ḥadīth. In his book Kitāb al-Dīn he devotes a chapter headed "Bāb Kitābat al-Ḥadīth" (On the Writing of Ḥadīth). He begins by noting that the command to hold fast to the Qurʾān is established:

قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى خُذُوا مَا آتَيْنَاكُم بِقُوَّةٍ

Allāh the Exalted said: "Take what We have given you with firmness." (Q. 2:93, al-Baqara)

And then ḥadīths on the writing of ḥadīth: From ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀṣ (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu):

عَنِ ابْنِ عَمْرٍو بْنِ الْعَاصِ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ قَالَ كُنتُ أَكتُبُ كُلَّ شَيءٍ سَمِعتُهُ مِن رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيهِ وَسَلَّمَ أُرِيدُ حِفظَهُ فَنَهَتنِي قُرَيشٌ وَقَالُوا تَكتُبُ كُلَّ شَيءٍ وَرَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيهِ وَسَلَّمَ بَشَرٌ يَتَكَلَّمُ فِي الرِّضَا وَالغَضَبِ فَأَمسَكتُ عَنِ الكِتَابَةِ

From ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀṣ (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu): "I used to write down everything I heard from the Messenger of Allāh ﷺ, intending to preserve it. But the Quraysh disapproved of me and said: 'You write down everything, and the Messenger of Allāh ﷺ is a human being who speaks in states of contentment and anger.' So I stopped writing." (Abū Dāwūd — Taysīr)

Then the Prophet ﷺ pointed to his blessed mouth with his finger and said: "Write! By the One in whose hand is my soul — nothing comes out of this (mouth) but truth." So he went back to writing. (Abū Dāwūd)

From Abū Hurayra (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu):

عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ قَالَ شَكَا رَجُلٌ إِلَى النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ سُوءَ الْحِفْظِ فَقَالَ لَهُ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ اسْتَعِنْ بِيَمِينِكَ

From Abū Hurayra (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu): A man complained to the Prophet ﷺ about his poor memory. The Prophet ﷺ said to him: "Seek help from your right hand" (i.e., write things down). (Tirmidhī — Taysīr)

From ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (raḥimahu'llāh):

عَنْ عُمَرَ بْنِ عَبْدِالْعَزِيزِ أَنَّهُ كَتَبَ إِلَى أَبِي بَكْرٍ بْنِ حَزْمٍ مِنْ حَدِيثِ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ فَاكْتُبْهُ إِلَيَّ فَإِنِّي خِفْتُ دُرُوسَ الْعِلْمِ وَذَهَابَ الْعُلَمَاءِ وَلَا تَقْبَلْ إِلَّا حَدِيثَ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ

ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz wrote to Abū Bakr ibn Ḥazm: "Write to me whatever ḥadīths of the Messenger of Allāh you find, for I fear the loss of knowledge and the passing of the scholars — and accept only the ḥadīth of the Prophet ﷺ." (Bukhārī — Taysīr)

Ḥaḍrat adds: we should note that the command to write down the Qurʾān separately from other matters is also established. The narration of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhu) states:

عَنْ أَبِي سَعِيدٍ الْخُدْرِيِّ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ لَا تَكْتُبُوا عَنِّي شَيئًا غَيرَ القُرآنِ وَمَنْ كَتَبَ عَنِّي شَيئًا غَيرَ القُرآنِ فَلْيَمحُه

The Messenger of Allāh ﷺ said: "Do not write anything from me other than the Qurʾān — and whoever has written anything from me other than the Qurʾān, let him erase it." (Muslim)

Ḥaḍrat explains: This ḥadīth does not prohibit the writing of Ḥadīth in general. Rather it applies to a specific context: in the earliest period, the Companions were afraid that Ḥadīth might become mixed with the text of the Qurʾān in their written records, since at that time the Qurʾān was not yet formally compiled as a single book. So the Prophet ﷺ told them: do not write anything alongside the Qurʾān that might be confused with it. This is not a blanket prohibition on writing Ḥadīth — as is proven by the numerous aḥādīth above that encourage and authorise writing. He notes that approximately 250 years after the Prophet ﷺ, the Ḥadīth collections became scattered and the formal collections began — Imām al-Bukhārī (93 AH to 256 AH), Imām Muslim (132 AH to 261 AH), Imām Abū Ḥanīfa (80 AH to 182 AH), Imām Mālik (93 AH to 179 AH, with his Muwaṭṭaʾ), and Imām al-Shāfiʿī (born 150 AH).

Scholars, Hypocrites, and Heretics in the Chain of Ḥadīth

Ḥaḍrat observes that the sciences of Ḥadīth developed partly in response to the fabrication of traditions by hypocrites and heretics. He cites the famous ḥadīth:

عَنِ ابْرَاهِيمَ بْنِ عَبدِالرَّحمَنِ الْعُذرِيِّ قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيهِ وَسَلَّمَ يَحمِلُ هَذَا الْعِلمَ مِن كُلِّ خَلَفٍ عُدُولُهُ يَنفُونَ عَنهُ تَحرِيفَ الغَالِينَ وَانتِحَالَ الْمُبطِلِينَ وَتَأوِيلَ الجَاهِلِينَ

The Messenger of Allāh ﷺ said: "In every generation, the upright men of this knowledge will carry it — repelling from it the distortions of the extremists, the fraudulent claims of the falsifiers, and the interpretations of the ignorant." (al-Bayhaqī — Mishkāt)

Ḥaḍrat notes: The Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim is of the highest degree in scrutiny — the most rigorous collection of all. It has millions of ḥadīths in it. Yet the Ḥadīth scholars narrated tens of thousands of narrations, and we have a duty to accept these narrations — and a few false ones, once identified as false, cannot be used to discredit all of them. The isnād sciences developed to sift the authentic from the weak. This is a discipline unique to Islam — no other civilisation has developed such a science.

Ḥaḍrat further states in Miʿyār al-Kalām: The criteria for weighing narrators and their reports are as follows. In the matter of narration, the following are matters to consider: (a) the narrator, (b) the types of narration, (c) by certainty and probability, (d) by soundness and weakness, (e) connectivity and disconnection, (f) jarḥ wa taʿdīl (critique).

Rules of Tarjīḥ (Weighing Conflicting Reports)

Ḥaḍrat gives detailed principles for weighing competing narrations in Miʿyār al-Kalām:

1. The narrator with the best memory, discipline, and piety takes precedence over a weaker narrator.
2. If one narrator has a higher chain (sanadan ʿālī), his report takes precedence.
3. However, a narrator with many narrations is not necessarily better — e.g. Abū Hurayra's report does not necessarily take precedence over a report by ʿAbd Allāh ibn Masʿūd.
4. An Arab is given precedence in understanding because he can better understand the literal meaning of the narration.
5. The narrator who has the text written in a book takes precedence over a narrator who narrates from memory.
6. The narration of the senior Companions that comes to us from two directions takes precedence over one.
7. The narration of a narrator who was close to and present with the Prophet ﷺ takes precedence over a narrator who was distant.
8. The narration of one who heard the statement of the Prophet ﷺ in his state of being Muslim and mature (bālighan) takes precedence over one who was young or not yet Muslim at the time.
9. If the Prophet ﷺ heard the ḥadīth before and performed it — then his performance is given precedence over a later narration of the same event.
10. A complete, unbroken chain takes precedence over a broken chain or a mursal.
11. Men's narrations take precedence over women's in matters specifically related to men, and women's in matters specific to women.
12. The narration with a rāfiʿ (raising to the Prophet ﷺ) in its chain takes precedence — but when there is conflict and the scholars of jarḥ wa taʿdīl have evaluated the narrators, the one with the stronger isnad wins.
13. In conflict in jarḥ wa taʿdīl, the jarḥ takes precedence over taʿdīl. (Ḥaḍrat, Miʿyār al-Kalām)

The Necessities of Religion (Ḍarūriyyāt al-Dīn) — Qurʾān, Sunnah, and Ijmāʿ

Ḥaḍrat states: The necessities of religion are three matters: (1) The clear, unambiguous text (naṣṣ) of the noble Qurʾān and its undeniable meaning; (2) ḥadīth mutawātir (mass-transmitted ḥadīth); (3) Ijmāʿ qaṭʿī (definitive consensus). Ḥaḍrat explains the details of Ijmāʿ in his book Miʿyār al-Kalām.

The Fiqh al-Islāmī as Fourth Source — Qiyās

Ḥaḍrat states: The istinbāṭ (derivation) of Islamic legal rulings has the qiyās as its fourth source — after the Qurʾān, Sunnah, and Ijmāʿ. But this applies only within appropriate limits. He cautions: "Some qiyāsāt that take their origin from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth are correct and right — those are accurate. Others take their origin from personal opinion — they are not right. Some scholars were also at times confused in their ijtihād — and they would use qiyās based on personal opinion and then say: 'It is not in the Qurʾān or Ḥadīth.' Others in their ijtihād would reach rational conclusions even against the transmitted texts — but they could not grasp even the ordinary limits of these questions."

Testimonial Law (Shahāda) — Rules of Witness

A significant portion of Miʿyār al-Kalām is devoted to the rules of testimony (shahāda) in Islamic law. Ḥaḍrat discusses:

Types of testimony: (1) Sharʿī (religious/legal), (2) Qānūnī (statutory).
Sharʿī testimony requires attention to the following: (1) definition of testimony, (2) qualifications (niṣāb), (3) manner (ṭarīqa), (4) conditions (shurūṭ), (5) conformity (muṭābiqat), (6) oath of claim (badʿawā), (7) disagreements (ikhtilāf), (8) revocation (rujūʿ), (9) corroboration (tazkiya), (10) repudiation (tawātur), (11) confirmation (tawātur), (12) written documentation (ḥujjat taḥrīrī), (13) apparent circumstance (ḥukm ẓāhir), (14) preferential weighing (tarjīḥ shuhūd), (15) evidence of apparent fact (bār ithbūt).

The definition of testimony: It is an announcement in which the objective of a judge, through its influence and connection, establishes or produces a fact or circumstance relevant to a claim.

Matters from which testimony arises: real events (al-waqāʾiʿ al-aṣliyya) or circumstantial events (waqāʾiʿ shakhṣiyya) related to testimony.
(a) Shahādat māḍī: Past events and circumstances presented at a hearing — testimony given from these and a judgment (ḥukm) issued or an order (amr) based on them.
(b) Shahādat dastāwīzī: Documents presented to the court for its consideration.
(c) Shahādat shakhṣī yā zabānī: Personal testimony or verbal testimony — given in front of a court or by its order. Documentary testimony takes precedence over verbal testimony. The first-hand statements of the persons involved are more trustworthy than their written statements.

Testimony: cause and means, known fact and consequence.
Types of testimony by nature of circumstances: if a matter exists with no relevant judgment available then testimony is contested. If it does not exist — related testimony is negative. If both present and absent — from both directions — testimony is indeterminate.

The qualifications for a witness:
The witness must be: sensible, just (ʿādil), a witness to his own work, not a known enemy, not seeking to obtain gain, not disqualified by testimony, competent.
The witness must be of sound character: not dishonest, undependable, immoral, not seeking to bring criminal charges himself, not giving testimony in his own interest.
Conformity with the claim: the testimony must conform to the claim — differing synonyms cannot be used.
The place or time difference does not invalidate testimony.
The seal of a document cannot by itself invalidate a marriage contract.
Some acts at certain times can be given a valid interpretation — so testimony is not automatically discredited.
Oath of the witness (ḥalf shāhid): the opposing party can demand that the witness take an oath from the judge.
Recanting from testimony (rujūʿ ʿan al-shahāda): before the verdict is given, the witness can withdraw — the remaining testimony of witnesses is not vitiated. The false witness will be punished. After the verdict, the judge will refer back — and if the witness recants, compensatory claims will arise against him.

Tawātur: Tawātur has no fixed required number — the important thing is that the group be so large that a joint lie is rationally impossible among them. Tawātur produces definitive knowledge (ʿilm yaqīnī). Witnesses going against tawātur will not be accepted.

Testimonial documentary evidence: no judgment can be given based on a letter or government document alone. The witness must be present for testimony to be given. For remote matters, a chain of letters can be accepted. Qarīnat qāṭiʿa (conclusive circumstantial evidence): unacceptable for a witness's testimony before a judge. The first-hand evidence of a person — specifically the person's statements at the time — is most relevant. Documentary evidence takes precedence over verbal testimony by the standard of law.

The Verse of Tayammum and Its Detailed Commentary (Continuation)

Ḥaḍrat returns in the final pages of this section to the detailed commentary on the verse of purification (Q. 5:6), particularly the question of tayammum and the detailed rules that flow from it. From the Tafsīr Ṣiddīqī:

(Repeated for the continuation of commentary — Q. 5:6, Tafsīr Ṣiddīqī)

Wa in kuntum marḍā aw ʿalā safar: If you are ill or travelling. Some scholars restrict illness to those cases in which use of water would cause death or severe harm. Others say: where a trustworthy physician (ṭabīb māhir) or the person's own experience indicates that use of water will cause harm, tayammum is permissible. The well-known Ḥanafī position is: when there is a genuine and well-founded fear that use of water will cause harm — physical harm or severe worsening of illness — then tayammum is permitted. The general rule is: hardship is to be removed (al-mashaqqatu tajlibu al-taysīr).

On the question of how many times one may strike the earth for tayammum: Ḥaḍrat notes the well-known dispute. The Mishkāt tradition of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī reports: "One strike suffices — then wipe the face and then the backs of the hands." The taysīr (facilitation) principle applies here — Allāh does not intend hardship. The obligation is complete. He notes the account of two men who were travelling and had no water — one performed tayammum and prayed, then found water later and washed, while the other did not pray until he found water and then washed and prayed. The Prophet ﷺ said to the first: you performed according to the Sunnah and your prayer was counted twice — you have double reward. (Abū Dāwūd and al-Dārimī narrated this.)

Ḥaḍrat concludes with the important general principle: Farḍ iʿtiqādī (obligatory in belief) and farḍ ʿamalī (obligatory in practice) are not the same. Farḍ iʿtiqādī — denying it makes one a disbeliever. Farḍ ʿamalī — denying it in practice makes one an inveterate sinner but does not take one out of Islam. The Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī schools all hold the same view on the obligatory nature of wuḍūʾ. But there are differences among them on details — for example, Imām al-Shāfiʿī says the niyya (intention) is obligatory for wuḍūʾ, while the Ḥanafī school says it is a condition of full spiritual merit but not strictly obligatory for the wuḍūʾ to be legally valid. The deeper principles of these differences, and their jurisprudential reasoning, are explained in detail in Tafsīr Ṣiddīqī — and Ḥaḍrat is at pains throughout to remind his readers: Allāh intends ease for you, not hardship. Complete the ablution properly. Fulfill the worship of Allāh. Complete His favour — and be grateful.